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THE COMBAT EXCLUSION RULE AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Combat Exclusion Rule
The United States today has about two million soldiers,
sailors, and airmen' under arms. ' Of that number, approxi-
mately 230,000-eleven percent-are female.' Despite impres-
sive improvements in recent decades in both the overall num-
bers of women in the military and the career opportunities
presented to them,4 military women today are still proscribed
from engaging in the primary function of the military: combat.
Women are excluded from combat roles in the military
under a mechanism popularly known as the "Combat Exclu-
sion Rule." Each service has its own variation. Utilization of
women in the Navy 5 and the Air Force6 is governed by stat-
ute. The Army's exclusion rule is one of policy rather than
statute.7 The Marine Corps, falling within the Department of
1. The words "soldier," "sailor" and "airman" have various meanings within
the military. In this comment, "soldier" means any member of the Army or
Marine Corps, "sailor" means any member of the Navy, and "airman" means any
member of the Air Force, irrespective of rank or gender.
2. Rick Maze, Panel drafts largest fore cut since Vietnam, NAVY TIMES, Oct. 29,
1990, at 4. As of October 1990, labor figures were:
Army 744,170
Navy 590,500
Air Force 545,000
Marines 196,700
Total 2,076,405
Id.
3. ARMY TIMES, Anniv. Ed., 1990, at 106.
4. See generally 6 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEP'T OF
DEFENSE, MILITARY WOMEN IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (1988) [hereinafter
MILITARY WOMEN].
5. Utilization of women in the Navy is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 6015
(1988).
6. Utilization of women in the Air Force is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 8549
(1988).
7. The Army's lack of a statutorily mandated combat exclusion rule stems
from the process by which women were initially introduced into the Army-the
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the Navy, is generally covered by the Navy's rule, but has
adopted rules similar to those in the Army to cover ground
combat situations. s
The focus in this comment is on women in the Navy. The
Navy is highlighted for a number of reasons. First, the services
have vastly different roles and definitions of "combat." Direct-
ing attention to just one service will avoid confusion. The Navy
and Air Force rules are relatively clear-cut: women are not
allowed on combat ships or aircraft. The Army and Marine
Corps rules, with their zone concept of "combat," complicates
the analysis without adding significantly to the legal debate.9
Second, the Navy, along with the Air Force, is today a very
high-technology operation. These services anticipate fighting
"over-the-horizon" battles, where the enemy may never be actu-
ally seen by any but a very few of the warriors°-a factor
which bears upon the current value of physical strength, which
will become relevant as the analysis develops. Finally, of the
two services, the Navy is more steeped in tradition. The Air
Force, created as a separate service in 1948, is over 150 years
Women's Army Corps. That corps had its own exclusions. With the dissolution of
the corps, the Army adopted policies which it believed Congress would have
desired. See Women in the Militaty: Hearings Before the Militaty Personnel and Com-
pensation Subcomm. of the House med Semices Comm., 100th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sess. 7-8 (1987 & 1988) [hereinafter 1987 Heatings] (statement of Martin M.
Ferber, Senior Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs
Division, General Accounting Office).
8. See 1987 Heatings, supra note 7, at 6-7.
9. The complexity of the Army's system is seen in an explanation provided
to Congress by the General Accounting Office:
Army policy is governed by the Direct Combat Probability Code,
which ascribes to each Army job an assessment of the probability of
that job participating in direct combat. The policy was derived from
an analysis of four criteria: the duties of the job specialty, the unit's
mission, tactical doctrine, and location on the battlefield. Jobs are
assigned a code, P1 through P7. P1 represents the highest probability
of engaging in combat and P7 the lowest. Women cannot be assigned
to P1 jobs . . . . Battlefield location has the greatest impact upon the
"P" rating of a position.
MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 4, at 69.
10. The recent Persian Gulf War illustrates this concept. Faced with what ap-
peared to be a classic "ground war" against what was called the world's fourth
largest army, the U.S. first pummeled its opponent with an air assault, relying
upon missiles and other "smart weapons," making the short ground campaign an
almost casualty-free endeavor. High technology all but eliminated the need for a
ground confrontation.
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younger than the Navy, which traces its origins back to the
Revolutionary War era.
In the Navy, the governing statute is 10 U.S.C. section
6510. Section 6510 provides that the Secretary of the Navy
may prescribe the kinds of duty women may be assigned, but it
also limits that discretion by stating "women may not be as-
signed to duty on vessels or aircraft engaged in combat mis-
sions.""
The Navy has interpreted that language to mean women
must be excluded from all "combatant" vessels, that is, ships
which seek out, reconnoiter or engage the enemy.12 Owing to
their close and frequent interaction with the combatants, other
"support" ships, such as cargo, ammunition, and re-fueling
vessels, had, until recently, also been determined to be unavail-
able to female sailors.' 3
B. The Impact of the Rule on Military Women
The impact of the combat exclusion rule on women is
pronounced. First, some skills are only relevant on combatants,
and so women are precluded from jobs concerned with those
11. 10 U.S.C § 6015 states:
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women
officers, women warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the
Regular Navy and Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and quali-
fied for military duty. The Secretary may prescribe the kind of mili-
tary duty to which such women members may be assigned and the
military authority which they may exercise. However, women may not
be assigned to duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in com-
bat missions nor may they be assigned to other than temporary duty
on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of
a similar classification not expected to be assigned combat missions.
61d. as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-513, Title V, Part A, § 503(44), 94 Stat. 2914
(1980).
12. A recent Navy formulation for "combat mission" reads:
A combat mission is defined as a mission of an individual unit, ship
or aircraft that individually, or collectively as a naval task organization,
has as one of its primary objectives to seek out, reconnoiter, and
engage the enemy. The normal defensive posture of all operating
units is not included within the definition.
Women in the Militaty: Hearing Before the Militaiy Personnel and Compensation
Subcomm. of the House Armed Seivices Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1990) [here-
inafter 1990 Hearings] (prepared statement of Vice Admiral J.M. Boorda, Chief of
Navy Personnel, Department of the Navy).
13. See 1990 Heating; supa note 12, at 29, 32 (statements of Vice Admiral
J.M. Boorda, Chief of Navy Personnel).
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skills.' 4 Second, a large number of otherwise-available jobs
with skill areas open to women are made unavailable because
they are to be performed aboard combatants. The result of
these two factors, as revealed by Navy figures, is that approxi-
mately half of the total number of Navy jobs are closed to
women. 5 Third, to maintain the sea-shore rotation 6 at the
level the Navy considers optimal, there must be some shore
jobs set aside for men to rotate into after a sea duty tour. 7
The end result of these limits is that the Navy has effec-
tively placed a ceiling on the overall number of women it can
absorb-at around eleven percent of total end-strength." The
situation was summed up by a Federal District Court judge as
follows:
Despite the current policy to enlarge the female compo-
nent in the naval forces, the fact remains that only so
many shore-confined members are capable of being inte-
grated into a contingent that is "organized, trained and
equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat inci-
dent to operations at sea."' 9
14. See MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 4, at V. As of July 1988, ten percent of
the Navy's skills were not open to women.
An example of this might be a Boiler Technician. A person who is referred
to as a Boiler Technician (literally, as in "Boiler Technician First Class Smith") is
trained in maintaining boilers. The vast majority of boilers, if not all, are located
aboard ships--they provide the steam which propels the screws which drive the
ship. If no women were allowed on ships then there would be no need to train
women as Boiler Technicians.
Though, of course, there is a need for Boiler Technicians aboard ships to
which women may be assigned, and so women may be trained as Boiler Techni-
cians, there are nuclear power plants, high-technology electronic components, etc.,
which are only necessary aboard combatants. Because there is no reason to train
women to fix those components, those skills are not open to women.
15. See MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 4, at V.
16. "Sea-shore rotation" is the phrase in which the Navy conceptualizes its
concern for the amount of time each sailor is assigned to a sea-going vessel versus
the amount of time spent assigned to a shore-based unit. The idea is to allow
each sailor an opportunity to rotate to shore duty as often as feasible-consistent
with maintaining a properly trained crew aboard the seagoing vessels. Maintaining
an optimal rotation is desired, ultimately, to maintain morale.
17. See MARTIN BINKIN & SHIRLEY J. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 25
(1977).
18. See MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 4, at 45. A chart indicates that the total
number of enlisted females in the Navy dropped somewhat after peaking in 1984.
"End-strength" is the overall limit set by Congress in its yearly defense appropria-
tions act on the number of military personnel each service is allowed to have at
the end of the fiscal year.
19. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D.D.C. 1978) (quoting 10 U.S.C.
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The rule also impairs the professional advancement of Navy
women. Advancement within those skills which are off limits to
women is completely foreclosed. Moreover, especially in the
officer ranks but also among senior enlisted, career pro-
gression is often tied to successful completion of jobs which
only exist on combatants. Most high-level positions within the
military can only be attained by properly "getting your ticket
punched," that is, by successfully completing key jobs that
provide experience necessary to perform at the next level with-
in each particular professional field.
For example, the Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S.
Pacific Fleet (COMNAVAIRPAC)-the Navy admiral who con-
trols all of the aircraft and related bases and units located on
the U.S. West Coast and in the Pacific-is chosen based upon a
record of accomplishments within the aviation warfare special-
ty. These accomplishments must necessarily include, among
many other things, having flown in a carrier-based aviation
unit, commanded a carrier-based aviation unit, and command-
ed an aircraft carrier. As a result of the combat exclusion rule,
none of these jobs are open to women. Therefore, as the sys-
tem is currently constructed, no woman, regardless of her
competence as a pilot or military leader, can become
COMNAVAIRPAC.
C. The Impact of the Rule Outside the Military
These two related constraints-limits on the number of
women which the services can absorb and limits on the career
opportunities for those women-deny women valuable econom-
ic, educational and sociological benefits.
1. Economic
The principle area of impact is economic. Having over two
million employees, excluding civilians, the Defense Department
is the country's largest employer, public or private." The mil-
itary provides its members with compensation tied to a pay
scale which does not differentiate between men and women,
§ 5012(a) (1970)).
20. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 31-32.
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nor between types of jobs, within the same rank.2 1 It also pro-
vides tax-free allowances or benefits-in-kind for housing and
subsistence.2 2 In addition, medical care is provided at no cost,
and life insurance is available at minimum costs. 23
The military also serves as the nation's largest and best
known vocational trainer. "[E]ach year the armed services offer
to thousands of people an opportunity to acquire skills and
knowledge that not only enables them to carry out their mili-
tary duties but, in many instances, prepares them for more
productive careers when they leave the service." 24 There are
also programs such as the GI Bill, the Veterans Educational
Assistance Program, and tuition assistance, which financially
assist members seeking to continue their education either
while still on duty or upon leaving the service.
2. Sociological
The other major impact that the combat exclusion rule
has on women is sociological. Women are not allowed to en-
gage in an activity which for a large number of men in the
services constitutes an expression of patriotism or devotion to
constitutional ideals.25 The situation was summed up by two
researchers as follows:
The social stereotype is that women should be less con-
cerned with the affairs of the world than men. Our politi-
cal choices and our political debate often reflect a belief
that men who have fought for their country have a special
qualification or right to wield political power and make
political decisions. Women are in no position to meet this
qualification. 6
21. See NAvY TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at 10.
22. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 31-32.
23. Additional economic benefits include a retirement plan that allows mem-
bers to retire at between 50% (at 20 years of service) and 75% (at 30 years of
service) of the pay earned at the time of retirement; civil service preferences; a
world-wide low-cost hotel service; tax free shopping on base; and limited free
travel wherever military cargo planes fly. See BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 33.
24. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 35.
25. "There is, in addition to the practical benefits that inure upon serving in
the Navy a moral element that forms an integral part of the overall experience."
Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D.D.C. 1978).
26. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 38 n.12 (quoting statement by Profes-
sor Norman Dorsen, Equal Rights: Hearings before the Senate Judicialy Committee, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
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Examples of the utility of that "special qualification" range
from civil service preferences for veterans27 to the 1988 presi-
dential campaign in which the combat record of George Bush
was made a focal point. In fact, the lack of a military record
added significantly to the problems of Vice Presidential candi-
date Dan Quayle in that election.
Further, the various reasons advanced in support of the
combat exclusion rule serve to enforce the notion that women
need to be protected. 8 Those reasons for keeping women
out of combat boil down primarily to two: (1) protecting wom-
en from combat and (2) protecting men, particularly the mo-
rale of men, from the intrusion of women into this
historically-male arena. However, both rationales can be and
have been extended to occupations outside of the military. If
women require protection against hostile forces, perhaps they
require protection from employment as prison guards.29 It is
reasonable to extrapolate from society's segregation of women
from combat that women should also be protected from other
unpleasant and hazardous aspects of life.
The military, in dealing with very large numbers of young
people, also plays a significant socialization role. Individuals
from all over the country and from all cultural, religious, and
economic groups are brought together. Since prejudice is gen-
erally the product of ignorance about others, forced interac-
tion as equals with those others can break down the prejudice.
27. An "absolute lifetime" civil service preference plan which required that
"all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for
appointment ahead of any qualified nonveterans" was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). The Court,
finding the law facially gender-neutral with no "discriminatory purpose," denied a
challenge by a woman who claimed that the preference operated "overwhelmingly
to the advantage of males" in that there were almost no female veterans. Id. at
259
28. See infra text accompanying notes 133-54 for a discussion of some of the
justifications for the combat exclusion rule.
29. That was the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
In denying a Title VII challenge to the State of Alabama's refusal to hire
an otherwise qualified female as a prison guard, the Court stated "[t]he
employee's very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to pro-
vide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility."
Id. at 336.
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After the enlistment expires, these new, broadened concep-
tions of the outside world are taken back home.
These attitudinal changes are often crucial to success in
other institutions in American society. The extent to which
women are judged on their abilities and performance rather
than upon sexual differences could lead "to a higher estima-
tion of their personal worth and to placing a higher value up-
on achievement and competence."
30
D. Focusing the Issue
In sum, the combat exclusion rule takes a toll on women
within the military and impacts upon society as a whole. This
concept is an essential foundation for any objective review of
the rule. The combat exclusion rule, despite its seemingly be-
nign nature, has real costs.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the current
state of the combat exclusion rule, assess the rationale behind
the rule, and then to analyze the rule's validity and its appro-
priateness in today's society. In particular, the analysis will
focus on the applicability of current constitutional equal pro-
tection theory and on the role of the courts in this debate.
The stakes involved have been laid out above. What fol-
lows is an effort to place the combat exclusion debate within a
legal framework. The first part details the legislative history of
the statutory bar against Navy women on combat vessels. The
paper next explores the role the courts have assumed in mili-
tary affairs. Then the paper examines the courts and women,
specifically how the courts apply equal protection to gender
classifications. Finally, through an extended analogy to a case
which did strike down aspects of the combat exclusion rule,
the current justifications for the combat exclusion rule are
held up to the court's current standards.
30. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 37 n.11 (quoting Mariclaire Hale &
Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Draft: Response to Critics of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 208 (1971-72)).
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II. BACKGROUND: THE MILITARY, WOMEN, AND THE LAW
A. The Legislative History of Women in the Military
1. The Early Years
Prior to World War II, the role of women in the services
was minimal. A few women-disguised as men-did participate
in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil
War.3 1 However, due to the predominance of brute strength
as the deciding factor in essentially hand-to-hand combat and
"Victorian concepts of propriety" women were kept from par-
ticipating in combat.3 2
Though approximately 13,000 women did serve in the
Navy and Marine Corps during World War 1,33 the impact of
women in the military was first felt to a significant degree in
World War II. In that war, about 350,000 women were utilized
by the four services.3 4 Though generally placed in "tradition-
al" female roles, such as health care and administration, wom-
en "demonstrated their competence in virtually every occupa-
tion outside of direct combat."3 Some of these women were
employed as little as twelve miles behind the advancing front
lines.3 6
That dramatic and unprecedented utilization of women in
the services did not survive the war. As part of the
de-mobilization, which caused the total number of military
personnel to plummet from a peak of 12.1 million down to 1.4
million, 7 the number of women in the services was reduced
to just 14,000, or one percent of the total, by 1948.8
2. The Inception of the Combat Exclusion Rule
However, despite the apparent willingness to return to
pre-war policies, Congress expressed its appreciation of
women's service in the form of the Women's Armed Services
31. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 4-5.
32. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 4-5.
33. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 5.
34. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 7.
35. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 7.
36. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 7.
37. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 10.
38. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 10.
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Integration Act of 1948." The act eliminated the "temporary"
status applied to women during World War II, making them a
regular part of the armed forces. It also had the effect of set-
ting a limit on the number of women in the military, the kinds
of jobs they could hold, and the maximum ranks they could
achieve.4" It also provided the nation with the original combat
exclusion rule.4'
The status of women in the military remained within the
1948 Act's guidelines until 1967. As a result of pressure from
the growing women's movement and the desire to lower the
number of men required to be drafted, Congress in that year
removed the statutory two percent end-strength limit on wom-
en in the services and raised the maximum ranks women could
achieve. 42
The 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the number of wom-
en in the services and in their utilization. Congressional pas-
sage of the Equal Rights Amendment,43 increasing pressure
from women's groups, the suspension of conscription, and
increasing judicial scrutiny combined to create a "watershed
decade for women."44 In the Navy, the percentage of women
among the enlisted sailors and officers more than doubled
between 1970 and 1980, from approximately three percent to
almost eight percent.
45
In 1978, shortly after a Federal District Court had struck
down the Navy's combat exclusion rule, section 6015, in Owens
v. Brown,4 6 the law was amended. The absolute restriction
against women serving on ships was modified: ships not ex-
39. Act of June 12, 1948, Pub. L. No. 625, 62 Stat. 356.
40. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.
41. See 1987 Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.
42. BINKIN & BACH, supra note 17, at 12.
43. The Equal Rights Amendment was passed by Congress on March 22,
1972. The original deadline for ratification by two-thirds of the states was March
22, 1979. By 1978, 35 states had ratified the proposed amendment, just three
short of the number required. Congress extended the original deadline by three
years, to March 22, 1982. During that time no states ratified the ERA and, in
fact, three states rescinded their ratifications. The ratification effort failed with the
expiration of the second deadline, on March 22, 1982. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-30 (2d ed. 1988).
44. ARMY TIMES, supra note 3, at 104. See also BINKIN & BACH, supra note
17, at 13-14.
45. MILITARY WOMEN, supra note 4, at 3, 45.
46. 455 F. Supp. 291 (1978). See i'fra notes 114-32 and accompanying text
for a more detailed review of the decision.
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pected to be involved in combat were made open to women.
Thus, repair ships and salvage ships were opened up to wom-
en. Recently, the Navy's Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships,
which have primary responsibility for replenishing ships at sea,
were also made available for females.47
Since 1978, the legal status of Navy women has not
changed. The law now mandates that women may not serve
aboard combatants, except for limited periods of up to six
months when the ship is not expected to have a combat mis-
sion."
B. Judicial Oversight of Military Affairs
A threshold question for any examination of congressional
legislation prescribing the role of women in the military must
concern the role of courts in military affairs. The Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power to "provide and
maintain a Navy,"4" and to "make rules for the government
and regulation of the land and naval forces."5" The executive
branch is granted power as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces.5 The judiciary has no similar explicit role in military
affairs.
In 1973, the Supreme Court had occasion to explore the
role of the judiciary in light of these explicit constitutional
grants to the congressional and executive branches. Gilligan v.
Morgan,5 2 which came about in the wake of the 1970 shoot-
ings at Kent State University, concerned an effort by students
attending Kent State to enjoin the governor of the state from
"prematurel" employing the National Guard to quell civil disturbances.
In dismissing the claim on justiciability grounds, the court
stated:
The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, sub-
ject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Execu-
47. 1990 Heamings, supra note 12, at 29, 32.
48. See supra note 11.
49. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. 13.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 14.
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1.
52. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
53. Id. at 1.
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tive Branches.'
The court, however, was careful to point out that "we neither
hold nor imply that the conduct of the National Guard is al-
ways beyond judicial review."55
Despite the general deference which the Court stated was
owed to the Congress and the President, the Supreme Court
has engaged in reviews of military matters. In 1973, an Air
Force lieutenant challenged a law which automatically granted
benefits to male members with spouses but required female
members to prove that their spouses were in fact dependent
on them. The Court, in Frontiero v. Richardson,56 did indeed
find the matter justiciable. Relying upon equal protection argu-
ments, the Court struck down the law without any mention of
a concern for encroaching into military matters.
Two years later, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,5 7 the Supreme
Court again reached the merits in a case involving military
affairs. The Court there rejected a claim from a Navy lieuten-
ant that he had been discriminated against by a policy which
granted women a longer period of time to attempt to gain
promotion before being involuntarily separated from that job.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court, again applying equal
protection analysis, determined that "Congress may thus quite
rationally have believed" the law necessary.58 As in Frontiero,
the military affairs concerns expressed in Gilligan were not ad-
dressed.
Clearly then, the courts do have a role to play in military
affairs. In striking down the then-existing combat exclusion law
for the Navy, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, as part of a review of Supreme Court treatment
of the matter, stated:
Whether the deference due particular military determina-
tions rises to the level of occasioning nonreviewability is a
question that varies from case to case and turns on the
degree to which the specific determinations are laden with
discretion and the likelihood that judicial resolution will
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 11.
56. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
57. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
58. Id. at 508.
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involve the courts in an inappropriate degree of supervi-
sion over primary military activities.59
From the Frontiero and Ballard cases, at least, it appears
the Court is willing to entertain qualifying equal protection
cases involving gender-based line drawing by Congress despite
the military nature of the regulation at issue.
Keeping in mind the constraints imposed by very real
separation of powers concerns, the focus here now shifts to an
examination of the treatment by the courts of gender classifica-
tions within the equal protection clauses.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND WOMEN
A. Establishing the Standard
The relationship between men and women for most of
this country's history was summed up in 1973 by Justice
Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richard-
son.6" "There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally,
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'roman-
tic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage. "61
Indeed, as that court noted in support of its position, the
founders of this country were, at its conception, of the opinion
"that women should be neither seen nor heard in society's
decisionmaking councils." 62
That widely-held position dramatically impacted the way
women were treated by the law. Women were long considered
by the law not to be persons distinct from their husbands. It
was not until 1920 that women were given the right to vote in
this country by the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.6 s
A critical point in surveying the genesis of the application
of equal protection concepts to lines drawn along gender lines
is that that genesis does not parallel the archetypical equal
protection case-that of race. In fact, five years after the
59. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978).
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
61. Id. at 684.
62. Id. at 684 n.13.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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post-Civil War Amendments64 freed the slaves and provided
us, 100 years later, with the doctrinal tool for legally eradicat-
ing distinctions drawn along racial or ethnic lines, a Supreme
Court Justice remarked:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life ....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to
fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
This is the law of the Creator.
65
Clearly, while the legislators and citizens of the late nine-
teenth century United States were concerned with the arbitrary
imposition of legal inequalities upon black people, they had no
such concern for the somewhat similar situation faced by wom-
en. As a consequence, the Supreme Court's review of gender
discrimination claims has taken a less stringent form than that
utilized in racial classification cases.
B. Early Cases-"Rationality Review"
The most noteworthy of the early gender discrimination
cases is the 1948 decision in Goesart v. Cleary."6 There the Su-
preme Court refused to enjoin the enforcement of a Michigan
law which banned a woman from working as a bartender un-
less she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner."67 After
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
65. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 442, 446, (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). See
also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1559 (2d ed. 1988).
66. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). There is an earlier case of interest, Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which a labor law setting a ten hour per day limit
on women who worked in "any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry"
was challenged. Despite the Court's deference to the 1905 decision in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the "right and liberty to contract" was
enshrined, the limitation was upheld. Though asserting that "in the matter of
personal and contractual rights [women] stand on the same plane as the other
sex," Justice Brewer wrote:
Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual
rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are con-
cerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be
true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon him and look
to him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper dis-
charge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own
health, but the well-being of the race-justify legislation to protect her
from the greed as well as the passion of man.
208 U.S. 412, 422.
67. The opinion reads:
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determining "Michigan could, beyond, question, forbid all
women from working behind a bar,"68 the Court stated that
since "the line they have drawn is not without a basis in rea-
son" the law must be upheld.69 Thus, in sharp contrast to the
early race cases,7" laws drawing lines based upon gender were
initially subjected to the Court's most minimal standard, ra-
tionality review."
Despite the deference normally associated with rationality
review,72 in 1971 the Supreme Court for the first time struck
down a gender-based classification on equal protection
grounds.75 In Reed v. Reed,74 the mother of a deceased child
As part of the Michigan system for controlling the sale of liquor, bar-
tenders are required to be licensed in all cities having a population
of 50,000 or more, but no female may be so licensed unless she be
"the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor estab-
lishment.
335 U.S. 464, 465 (quoting Section 19(a) of Act 133 of the Public Acts of Michi-
gan, 1945, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.990(1) (Cum. Supp. 1947)).
68. Id. at 465.
69. Id. at 467.
70. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1466 (2d ed.
1988). As early as 1879, the Supreme Court was evidencing a hostility towards
racial line drawing. The actual classification of race as a "suspect" classification
demanding "strict scrutiny" came in 1944, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), four years before Goesart.
71. See generally Russell Galloway, Means-Ends Scrutiny in American Constitutional
Law, 21 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 449 (1988). The article offers a succinct discussion of
the different analyses used by the Supreme Court. Of particular relevance to this
comment are the labels ascribed to the three most utilized and recognizable levels
of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate, or heightened, scrutiny, and rationality
review. The particular requirements set forth by the Supreme Court will be dis-
cussed as they become relevant.
72. Id.
73. The concept of "equal protection" is rooted in the very wording of
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any petson within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
The Fourteenth Amendment is explicitly directed towards actions by state
governments. Equal protection was held by the Supreme Court to be a compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and therefore applicable to
the federal government's actions in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
74. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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challenged an Idaho law which preferred the child's father in
appointment as administrator of the child's estate. This statuto-
ry preference was based simply upon the gender of one of the
competing, otherwise equally qualified, contestants.75 The
State of Idaho argued that the law was a simple way to elimi-
nate some controversy whenever two equally qualified persons,
one male, one female, were situated to be appointed to admin-
ister an estate.7" The law would, on occasion, eliminate the
necessity for a hearing to choose between the petitioning rela-
tives. 77
After embracing a now-classic "rationality review" formula-
tion 71 from it's earlier Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia79 deci-
sion, the Court addressed Idaho's argument with the following:
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elim-
ination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.8
0
Thus, despite its employment of the most deferential form
of review, the Court indicated it was willing to put some bite
into gender discrimination cases.
C. Struggling Towards a New Standard
1. Flirting With "Strict Scrutiny"
The Supreme Court's increased concern with
gender-based discrimination was brought home forcefully just
two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson."' Lieutenant Sharron
Frontiero was a female Air Force officer who wished to receive
75. "Section 15-314 [of the Idaho Code] provides that 'of several persons
claiming and equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females.'"
Id. at 73 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-314).
76. Id. at 76.
77. Id.
78. "The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
For a discussion on the Supreme Court's fondness for the Royster Guano
formulation, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 594 (11th ed. 1985).
79. 253 U.S. 412(1920).
80. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
81. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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increased pay allowances which are granted to service mem-
bers with "dependents."82 For male members, Air Force poli
cy was to provide these increased allowances whenever that
member had a spouse. For female members, the allowances
were granted only if the member could show the spouse was in
fact dependent upon her for over one half of his support.8 3
Justice Brennan, writing for himself and three other justic-
es, held the policy up to exacting scrutiny. Citing Reed for his
support, he stated that "classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, are inherently suspect."84
Since the government conceded that it had no other justifica-
tion for the policy beyond "administrative convenience,"" the
policy was considered to be the "very kind of arbitrary legisla-
tive choice forbidden by the [Constitution]." 6
The Court, then, came within one vote of making gender
a suspect classification subject to "strict judicial scrutiny.""
82. The military paycheck is composed of a number of different types of pay.
Typically, the bulk of the member's paycheck is comprised of "Basic Pay," which
is taxable salary. In addition, there are a number of non-taxable allowances.
Among these are allowances for quarters. The quarters allowance is comprised of
the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and the Variable Housing Allowance
(VHA). Both BAQ and VHA are determined by the member's rank and the
member's dependents status. Members with dependents, i.e., non-member spouse,
child, etc., receive a greater allowance than do "single" members. NAVY TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1990, at 10.
83. 411 U.S. at 679-80.
84. Id. at 682.
85. Id. at 688.
86. Id. at 690 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77, 76).
87. Justice Brennan's words were: "[W]e can only conclude that classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
Id. at 688.
A clear statement of what the court means by "strict scrutiny" was offered
in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Justice Brennan, in his plurality opinion,
wrote:
[W]e have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that
disadvantage a "suspect class," or that impinge upon the exercise of a
"fundamental right." With respect to such classifications, it is appro-
priate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the
State to demonstrate that it's classification has been precisely tailored to
serve a compelling governmental interest.
457 U.S. at 216-17 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
2. Falling Short
Strict scrutiny, however, was not embraced by the Court.
One problem with Jiistice Brennan's plurality opinion, as ex-
plained by Justice Powell in a concurrence joined by two other
Justices, was that such a classification was unnecessary to the
holding. Reed provided adequate authority for striking the
statute.
88
Of greater, indeed "compelling," concern to Justice
Powell, however, was the prospect of intervening in the politi-
cal process."9 The opinion was handed down in May 1973,
just over one year after Congress had passed the Equal Rights
Amendment-six years before the first ratification deadline was
to expire. The short concurring opinion concluded:
[D]emocratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in
the restraint of the Court is impaired, when we appear
unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and
political importance at the very time they are under con-
sideration within the prescribed constitutional process-
es.
91
With the narrow, and apparently historically fortuitous, failure
to classify gender as a suspect classification, the standard of
review for gender cases reverted to the traditional rationality
review.
3. Back to "Rationality Review"
Two years after Frontiero this reversion took place in the
1975 case Schlesinger v. Ballard.92 That case presented the
Court with another challenge to a military, gender-oriented
policy statute-this time by a male. Lieutenant Robert Ballard
challenged a Navy policy which required that he be discharged
from the Navy where a similarly situated female officer would
not be discharged.93 Congress had allowed female officers
88. 411 U.S. 677, 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. Id.
90. See supra note 43.
91. 411 U.S. at 692.
92. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
93. Lieutenant Ballard's complaint rested upon disparate treatment given to
[Vol. 32
1992] COMBAT EXCLUSION RULE 247
more time to gain promotion before falling victim to the
military's "up or out" philosophy.9 4
The Court's denial of relief to Lt. Ballard was based upon
its conclusion that "Congress may quite rationally" have de-
sired to make allowance for female officer's more limited op-
portunities for advancement.9" This deference, highlighted by
the Court's willingness to hypothesize about Congressional
motives, was tempered somewhat. After pointing out that the
classification was not brought about "merely because of admin-
istrative or fiscal policy considerations," 6 the Court contrast-
ed Lt. Ballard's situation with those posed in -Reed and
Frontiero:
[T]he different treatment of men and women naval offi-
cers ... reflects, not archaic and overbroad generaliza-
tions, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that male and
female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated
with respect to opportunities for professional service. Ap-
pellee has not challenged the current restrictions on wom-
en officers' participation in combat and in most sea du-
ty. 97
Three points of interest arise from the Ballard opinion.
First is the Court's previously noted reversion, after Frontiero,
to rationality review, albeit a more stringent version, for
gender-based classifications. The second point regards the
Court's construction, "archaic and overbroad generalizations."
This standard seems to indicate that despite the deferential
review, the court will require some legitimate reason behind
the classification. Third and most important to this discussion
members according to sex. Being a male, Lt. Ballard was subject to 10 U.S.C. §
6382, which required he be discharged from the Navy after failing two times to
be selected for the next-highest rank, Lieutenant Commander. Females were
specifically excluded from coverage by this law. Instead, female lieutenants were
covered by 10 U.S.C. § 6401, which allowed them to remain in the Navy, even if
passed over for promotion two or more times, until they had completed 13 years
of service as an officer. See Schlesinge?; 419 U.S. at 498-99.
94. Id. at 501-05. The "up or out" philosophy in the military is based upon
the organization's pyramidal structure. To avoid stagnation in the lower ranks, offi-
cers who fail to gain promotion are honorably discharged. The purpose is to
vacate an appropriate number of spots within that rank into which junior officers
can move. See id. at 502-03.
95. Id. at 508.
96. Id. at 503.
97. Id. at 508.
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is the fact that the Court was careful to point out that there
had been no challenge by Lt. Ballard to that law which ensured
that males and females were "not similarly situated"-the com-
bat exclusion rule.
While the full import of the third point is still unclear,
since the Supreme Court has not heard a direct challenge to
section 6015, the apparent heightened emphasis to be accord-
ed gender-based classifications, evidenced by the first two
points, was soon to be more explicitly addressed. In the wake
of two lower-court decisions affecting military women," both
of which had utilized rationality review, the Supreme Court
came to grips with its ambivalence over gender-based classifica-
tions and forged a new level of review: "intermediate scruti-
ny."99
4. Embracing an Intermediate Standard
The practice of subjecting gender-based classifications to
intermediate scrutiny was launched in the 1976 case Craig v.
Boren.'"° In Craig, the Supreme Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to an Oklahoma law which had set different age limits
for the purchase of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer, depending
upon the sex of the person. Males were prohibited from pur-
98. In Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals struck down a Marine Corps regulation which required
pregnant Marines to be discharged fror- the Corps.
In Kovach v. Middendorf, 424 F. Supp. 72 (D. Del. 1976), the district court
in Delaware upheld a Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) policy
which created a disparity between males and females in required Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT) scores. Female applicants were required to score higher on the
SAT than were male candidates.
99. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.16 (1982).
This technique of "intermediate" scrutiny permits us to evaluate the
rationality of legislative judgement with reference to well-settled con-
stitutional principles . . . . [Only] when concerns sufficiently absolute
and enduring can be clearly ascertained from the Constitution and
our cases do we employ this standard to aid us in determining the
rationality of the legislative choice.
Id. See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988). Despite the
arguably wide-ranging criteria established by Plyler, Justice O'Connor noted in
Kadrmas that intermediate or, as named by her, "heightened," scrutiny "has gener-
ally been applied only in cases that involved discriminatory classifications based on
sex or illegitimacy." Id. at 459.
100. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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chasing the beer until they reached the age of twenty-one;
females were allowed to purchase the beer at age eighteen.'
justice Brennan's majority opinion0 2 quickly stated the
standard of review to be applied: "To withstand constitutional
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."'0 3
In the instant case, the disparate treatment of males and
females was not, in the Court's view, adequately justified.
Though Oklahoma's interest in protecting the health and safe-
ty of its citizens through reducing incidents of driving while
under the influence was held to be "important,"' 4 and so
passed the first part of the test, the law failed in the "means"
analysis, that is, the classification was not sufficiently related to
the important health and safety "end."'0 5
5. Settling in With the New Standard
Intermediate scrutiny, forged in Craig, appears to have
become the standard for review of gender-based classifications.
In 1977 the Supreme Court utilized it's Craig formulation in
Califano v. Goldfarb..6 to strike down a federal law which
granted benefits to widows upon the death of their insured
spouse, but only granted benefits to surviving widowers if they
were dependent upon the deceased.
101. Id. at 191-92. The issue was phrased by the Court as follows:
The interaction of two sections of an Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat.
Tit. 37 sections 241 and 245 (1958 and Supp. 1976), prohibits the
sale of "nonintoxicating 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18. The question to be decided is wheth-
er such a gender-based differential constitutes a denial to males 18-20
years of age of the Equal Protection of laws in violation of tile Four-
teenth Amendment.
Id. at 192.
102. Unlike in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justice Brennan
had the necessary five votes to support his opinion. In fact, six justices explicitly
supported the application of Justice Brennan's new standard of review. One other
concurrence was silent on the matter, and therefore arguably supportive as well.
The vote was 7 to 2. 429 U.S. at 191.
103. 429 U.S. at 197-98.
104. Id. at 199-200.
105. Id. at 200.
106. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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Three years later, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majori-
ty in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,' °7 ac-
knowledged Craig's call for "a somewhat 'sharper focus' when
gender-based classifications are challenged."" 8 The Court
there upheld a California statutory rape law which had been
challenged because it applied only to males.
Finally, in the 1981 decision Rostker v. Goldberg,' the
Supreme Court declined an invitation by the Solicitor General
to modify its heightened scrutiny test in the areas of military
affairs and national security."0 The Court upheld the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act despite the fact that it required only
males, not females, to register for a military draft."'
In sum, though the Court's current members have not
addressed a gender-based classification, it is apparent the cur-
rent standard remains the one adopted in Craig v. Boren:
"[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." n 2
107. 450 U.S. 464 (1980).
108. Id. at 468.
109. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
110. d. Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the majority, wrote:
The Solicitor General argues, largely on the basis of cases emphasiz-
ing the deference due Congress in the area of military affairs and
national security, that this Court should scrutinize the MSSA [Military
Selective Service Act] only to determine if the distinction drawn be-
tween men and women bears a rational relation to some legitimate
Governmental purpose, and should not examine the Act under tile
heightened scrutiny with which we have approached gender-based
discrimination. We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due
process or certainty in the law will be advanced by any further "re-
finement" in the applicable tests as suggested by the Government.
Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
111. Not surprisingly, the case focused on the combat exclusion rule.
. Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority "[tlhe 'fact that Congress and the
Executive have decided that women should not serve in combat fully justifies Con-
gress in not authorizing their registration, since the purpose of registration is to
develop a pool of potential combat troops." Id. at 79.
Both dissenting opinions took note of the fact as well. Justice White
opened his dissent (writing for himself and Justice Brennan) with: "I assume what
has not been challenged in this case-that excluding women from combat positions
does not offend the Constitution." Id. at 83. Justice Marshall, with whom justice
Brennan joined, noted that "this case does not involve a challenge to the statutes
or policies that prohibit female members of the Armed Services from serving in com-
bat." Id. at 87.
112. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976).
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IV. APPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO THE COMBAT
EXCLUSION RULE
The Supreme Court has not dealt with a direct challenge
to the combat exclusion rule. The purpose of this comment is
to anticipate that analysis, for surely it must come, barring an
unlikely renewed effort to pass another Equal Rights Amend-
ment or the equally unlikely prospect that Congress will
change its mind on the matter.'13
The immediate task is to pose a hypothetical challenge to
the combat exclusion rule and examine that challenge within
the guidelines of the court's espoused heightened scrutiny.
The imagination, fortunately, need not be strained greatly in
posing this hypothetical, for the precise issue has been put to a
federal district court.
A. Framing the Debate-Owens v. Brown
The one federal district court case dealing with the com-
bat exclusion rule is Owens v. Brown."4 Judge Sirica, sitting in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
was presented with a challenge to 10 U.S.C. section 6015 by a
group of female Navy officers and enlisted personnel." 5 The
law, as it then existed, banned women from all Navy ves-
sels. 1 6 The complainants sought injunctive and declaratory
113. On May 22, 1991, the U.S. House of Representatives did pass a Defense
appropriations bill which included a provision that would eliminate tile barrier to
women serving as pilots, navigators, or crew members on military combat aircraft.
The Senate passed a similar measure on September 30, 1991. The appropriations
act has not yet been acted on by the President. NAVY TIMES, August 12, 1991, at
3. The bill, if signed, would apparently have no effect on tile exclusion of women
from combatant vessels.
114. 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
115. Id. at 293-94.
116. As noted by the court in July 1978, 10 U.S.C. § 6015 read:
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women
officers appointed under section 5590 of this title, women warrant
officers, and enlisted women members of the Regular Navy and Regu-
lar Marine Corps shall be trained and qualified for military duty. The
Secretary may prescribe the kind of military duty to which such mili-
tary members may be assigned and the military authority.which they
may exercise. However, women may not be assigned to duty in air-
craft that are engaged in combat missions nor may they be assigned
to duty on vessels of the Navy other than hospital ships and trans-
ports.
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relief aimed at preventing the Secretary of the Navy from rely-
ing on section 6015 in setting personnel policy.
11 7
The four plaintiffs identified in the opinion" 8 were all
seeking access to Navy jobs they considered important to their
professional advancement." 9 For instance, the named plain-
tiff, Yona Owens, was an Interior Communications Electri-
cian. 2 Her job consisted of repairing complicated electron-
ics components which were used by the Navy for navigational
purposes. Sensibly enough, most of that navigation gear was
located aboard ships. Owens sought assignment aboard a ves-
sel so that she could "utilize her skills more fully."' 2' The
three other plaintiffs described in the opinion had similar pro-
fessional concerns.' 2
2
After a fairly lengthy discussion in which the court denied
the Government's claim that this case presented a
"nonjusticiable political question," 121 Judge Sirica launched
into an equal protection analysis. The test to be applied, on
the strength of Craig and Califano v. Goldfarb,124 was height-
ened scrutiny.
125
The first part of that analysis was simple. As the court
phrased it, the Government's assertion that the law was de-
signed to "increase the combat effectiveness of Navy ships" was
455 F. Supp. at 294 n.l.
The court goes on to note that "[iut is undisputed that there are no hospi-
tal ships or transports currently in service in the Navy." Id.
117. Id.
118. The case was certified as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Government challenged the certification of the class
on the grounds that "some female personnel may not share plaintiffs desire to
remove the statutory bar." Id. at 293.
The court granted certification for two reasons. First, the Government had
not demonstrated there was such "antagonism among Navy women." Id. Second,
the argument was not "legally significant" in that the suit was not attempting to
force women into sea duty, but rather was aimed at stopping the Navy from using
gender as an automatic disqualifier for sea duty. Id.
119. Id. at 295-96.
120. Id. at 295.
121. Id. at 295-96.
122. Id. at 296.
123. Id. at 299.
124. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
125. "[T]o withstand constitutional challenge, classifications by gender must be
substantially related to the achievement of [important] objectives." 455 F. Stipp. at
305 (citations omitted).
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a "governmental objective of the highest order."1 26  The
Court, therefore, quickly dispatched the "ends" analysis, and
the focus was shifted to the relationship of section 6015 to
"combat effectiveness."
That "means" analysis did not fare as well. The Court be-
gan its review by observing the Government had not even es-
tablished that military preparedness was in fact the objective of
the legislation.' 27 It noted that apparently the prohibition of
women on ships was "added casually, over the military's objec-
tions and without significant deliberation." 128 Further, "the
sense of the discussion is that section 6015's bar against assign-
ing females to shipboard duty was premised on the notion that
duty at sea is part of an essentially masculine tradition." 129
Nonetheless, the court acknowledged there could be legit-
imate governmental objectives behind this legislation.' It
then turned to the justifications offered by the government,
which the court succinctly enumerated:
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. The point retains its relevance today. The current version of the law
was created by amendment on October 20, 1978-three months after the Owens
decision voided the 1948 version. In hearings before the Military Personnel Sub-
committee of the House Armed Services Committee, military officials were still of
the opinion that the combat exclusion law was not needed or desired from a
military perspective. See Hearings on Militaiy Posture and H.IL 10929, Department of
Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, H.R. 7431, Assignment of
Women on Navy Ships, Before the House Aned Seivices Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1192, 1203 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings].
The Deputy Secretary of Defense had written to the speaker of the House
that "[t]he best long-term solution is to repeal both 10 U.S.C. § 6015 and 8549."
Id. at 1192. Section 8549 is the Air Force's combat exclusion rule.
Then-Secretary of the Navy Claytor was quite candid about the Navy's
position regarding amending § 6015:
If Congress is prepared to abolish the statute and leave it to the Sec-
retary of the Navy, I'm sure that I and my successors are perfectly
prepared to take that responsibility, and so I do not oppose the [Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense's] proposal to repeal the statute. But
rather than have a controversy or have a very difficult political
problem over doing that and accomplishing nothing, let's take the
step that will get us somewhere now and examine the question of
whether we should take the big step later on.
Id. at 1203.
130. The court notes that "there is no requirement that the Court must
overlook unexpressed legislative objectives that reasonably could have formed the
basis of the statute in question." Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 306 n.55.
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These concerns focus on the unknown effects that full
sexual integration might have on group dynamics under
combat conditions, on the ability of the Navy to operate as
effectively as it might with all male combatants, on the ca-
pacity of the American people to accept the prospect of
female combat casualties, and on the attitude of enemies to
engage the United States in combat because of a perceived
weakness in our combat arms.''
Additionally, the government argued that "the integration
of men and women aboard Navy ships is apt to cause morale
and discipline problems."'1
3 2
Judge Sirica dispatched each of these arguments on his
way to voiding section 6015. Eighteen years after that decision
was handed down, the reasons for striking the law have be-
come even more compelling. The points will now be addressed
sequentially, with an eye towards the situation facing today's
society.
B. The Justifications of Combat Exclusion
1. The Unknown Effects Full Sexual Integration Might Have
on Group Dynamics Under Combat Conditions
There are two ways to examine this argument. First, in the
abstract, the argument seems to fall short of constitutional
significance. The test from Craig requires that the
Government's means, here to prevent women from going into
combat, be substantially related to the admittedly "important"
goal of military effectiveness. It is difficult to see how "un-
known effects" can qualify as any reason whatsoever, let alone
a substantial reason.
This problem is borne home by the obvious fact that Con-
gress alone has the authority to make the modifications in the
law necessary to test the premise. Were Congress interested in
demonstrating its actions were not based upon "archaic and
overbroad generalizations"' 3 it alone could do so. Such a
proposal has been rejected by the Congress. 134
131. Id. at 306 (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 308-09.
133. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
134. See 1990 Heangs, supra note 12, at 2 (statement of Representative
Schroeder).
[Vol. 32
COMBAT EXCLUSION RULE
The second view of this argument acknowledges the truth
in the observation that we do not have any combat experience
involving females on which to draw, but observes the military
does have some relevant experience in the area. Female mili-
tary personnel are widely regarded by the military as highly
capable." 5 As a result of that view, and the 1978 amendment
to section 6015, the Navy estimated that by the end of 1990
there would be almost 10,000 women serving in shipboard
assignments.'3 6 This number includes women assigned to the
recently opened Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships, which
have responsibility for replenishing combatants at sea.137
The rationality of this line of argument can best be un-
derstood by juxtaposing two points. The first was eloquently
stated by the Secretary of the Navy back in 1978: "[W]hen you
get to the Navy it's a different problem. There is no
hand-to-hand combat in the Navy. There just is none. You
don't board enemy ships with a cutlass in your teeth any more.
This is all done by electronics and long-range missiles and that
type of thing."'38
The second point can best be illustrated by a statement
from Representative Schroeder:
Anybody who has seen the latest Army recruiting commer-
cial, has seen a female soldier operating a "non-combat"
communications van during field maneuvers. I think all of
us know that if you were in a real battle, the first person
you usually try to hit is the person running the communi-
cations van.3 9
If it can be assumed that CLF ships, without which the "com-
batants" would soon run out of food, ammunition, fuel, etc.,
The Senate has, however, recently created a commission to study the issue
of women in combat. Mark Thompson, Senate OKs Women Combat Pilots, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 1, 1991, at Al.
135. See Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 307. See also 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at
30; Andy Pasztor, In Wake of Gulf Wai, New Militaty Fight Looms Over Use of
Reservists and Women in Combat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1991, at A16.
136. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 29.
137. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 29, 32.
138. 1978 Hearings, supra note 129, at 1204.
139. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 3. Again, the recent Persian Gulf War
provides additional illustration. A major concern of the U.S. was Iraq's Scud mis-
siles. The U.S. response was the Patriot missile system, which were tasked with
destroying incoming Scuds. Women were assigned to the Patriot missile batteries.
See Jeannie Ralston, Women's Work, LIFE, May 1991, at 56.
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would be as likely a target as Representative Patricia
Shroeder's communication van, then we can say that for all
practical purposes Navy women, like Army women, will be in
combat, should there be a war.
When it is realized that (1) ships which do have women
aboard and interact with the Fleet, such as the CLF's, share the
risk of being hit with the combatants, and (2) the fact that,
other than being hit, those combatants would be engaged only
in "war done by electronics and long-range missiles and that
type of thing," the difference between what women do now
and what they could do without this law comes down to push-
ing buttons and monitoring electronics. Group dynamics
aboard combatants engaged in offensive action will not be
much different from group dynamics aboard any naval vessel
during normal training exercises. Group dynamics aboard
combatants suffering under an attack should not differ from
those dynamics which will take place should a CLF ship fall
under attack. In other words, the Navy seems to have already
made the argument moot.
2. The Ability of the Navy to Operate as Effectively as it Might
with All-Male Combatants
This is essentially the same argument as that debated
above, with a somewhat less gender-neutral flavor. As above,
the argument hinges upon a narrow view of "combatant." If
one views a combatant as any ship which might reasonably be
exposed to combat, the CLF ships noted above would certainly
qualify. The Congress and the Navy, by placing women on
such vessels, have impliedly concluded that those CLF ships
can operate as effectively with women aboard as with males
only.
Another anecdote might illustrate the point. In a 1988
hearing before the House Military Personnel and Compensa-
tion Subcommittee, Representative Jack Davis told of a ques-
tion he posed to an Army Major General. This Major General
was responsible for protecting central Europe from forty-six
divisions of Soviet tanks. Davis asked about a report he'd
heard that there were female intelligence officers assigned to
American forces there. Davis reports:
[A]pproximately 54 percent or roughly 35 women officers,
lieutenants and captains, [were] serving as the intelli-
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gence... officers at the company level. The question was
then put to Major General Griffin, what happens if the
balloon goes up? He said to me, they go forward with
their units.
I said, there is no thought of returning those officers
to the rear echelon? He said, "Congressman, they go for-
ward with their units."1
40
3. The Capacity of the American People to Accept the Prospect
of Female Combat Casualties
The responses posed to arguments one and two above
also apply here. If a Naval war were to come about, either the
Navy would have to pull its women off the CLF ships, change
the way in which ships are replenished, or accept that the
American people are going to experience female combat casu-
alties.
There are, in addition, other points worth noting. The
first is drawn from a review of the historical utilization of wom-
en in the United States military. As detailed above, female
participation in the military has jumped at those times when
the United States was involved in a national emergency. From
World War I through the Vietnam involvement, female partici-
pation in the military has been related to engagement in hostil-
ities. As a sociologist has observed in relation to this protection
notion: "It is therefore ironic that women tend to serve in the
military when the risks are the greatest." 'q
Aside from that, it can be argued that women are already
being exposed to "combat." In the words of Representative
Shroeder:
[W]e are seeing that the public is much more aware of the
realities than some of us think-that female police officers
face life threatening dangers. every single day, that one
women [sic] in America every 3.5 minutes is raped or sub-
jected to some kind of violence of some sort. We know
that we cannot protect women from violence anywhere in
our cities and in our rural areas. So I think the whole Vic-
torian notion of "we want to save them," is outdated. 4
140. 1987 Heafings, supra note 7, at 14.
141. 1987 Hearings, supra note 7, at 92.
142. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 4.
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Further, the accuracy of these views of "public opinion" is
in doubt. In 1990, a New York Times/CBS News poll asked
Americans if "women members of the Armed Forces should be
allowed to serve in combat units if they wanted to." 4 ' Sev-
enty two percent of the respondents answered in the affirma-
tive.' 44 A 1982 National Opinion Research Center poll re-
vealed similar feelings.'45 A 1991 poll, taken after the Persian
Gulf War, found 79% of respondents agreeing with the propo-
sition. 1
6
Indeed, the recent Persian Gulf War seems to have laid
the matter to rest. Despite the combat deaths of ten women
during the brief war, "[t]here hasn't been any national hue and
cry over the deaths of the women." 47 Similarly, the capture
of two female American troops by the Iraqis during the war
did not arouse pronounced concern on the part of the pub-
lic. 14
8
Essentially, then, aside from the debatable question of
whether such an argument should stand in the way of equal
protection, this argument can be challenged as both inconse-
quential in light of military realities and as being simply incor-
rect.
143. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 4, 8.
144. 1990 Hearings, supra note 12, at 4, 8.
145. 1987 Hearings, supra note 7, at 98. The testimony broke down the infor-
mation in detail:
I will read you all of the jobs that were given and the percent who
felt that women should be in those jobs. Typists in the Pentagon-97
percent; nurses in a combat zone-94 percent; ... military truck me-
chanics-83 percent; jet transport pilots ... -73 percent; jet fighter
pilots-62 percent; missile gunners in the United States-59 per-
cent; . . . commander of a large base-59 percent; . . . and then the
only job that did not have a majority agreeing was phrased as "sol-
diers in hand-to-hand combat"-and actually, the researchers who did
this research were surprise[d] at the large minority of people who ap-
proved, which was 35 percent.
146. Col. David H. Hackworth, War and the Second Sex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5,
1991, at 27.
147. Jeannie Ralston, Women's Work, LIFE, May 1991, at 54.
148. Id.
258 [Vol. 32
COMBAT EXCLUSION RULE
4. The Attitude of Enemies to Engage the United States in
Combat Because of a Perceived Weakness in Our Combat Arms
Seemingly, the most sensible way to examine that argu-
ment is to look to what the experts-the military-have stated.
In both 1948,149 when the law was first enacted, and
1978,50 when the law was amended, the military has asked
that there be no statutory bar.
The responses to arguments one and two, above, are also
pertinent. The enemy which saw women aboard combatant
vessels as a weakness should reasonably also view women
aboard the essential CLF ships as a weakness as well. The Navy
seems to believe that such concerns are not of sufficient weight
to keep women off of those CLF ships.
Finally, this argument is apparently mere speculation.
There is no discussion of the argument in the Owens case, nor
is there even a mention of it in any of the hearings before
House subcommittees in 1978, 1987 or 1990, despite the fact
that the military and, of course, Congress were represented at
each of those hearings.
5. Morale and Discipline Problems
The crux of this argument is that in combat situations
men and women would act in such a way as to degrade the
combat effectiveness of the mixed units. The problem was
phrased colorfully by Congressman Lancaster:
[O]ne of the problems raised with regard to women in
combat situations is... attitudinal and is something that
perhaps is very deeply ingrained in the American male psy-
che. This is an attitude of protectiveness in a brother or
sister .... or for that matter, girlfriend kind of relation-
ship. Second, is the romance angle that may develop in a
unit.'-"
We can recognize two distinct premises from the above
arguments. One assumption is that military men will be more
inclined to protect military women in combat situations at the
149. See Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 305-06 (D.D.C. 1978).
150. See 1978 Heaings, supra note 129, at 1192, 1203.
151. 1990 Heaings, supra note 12, at 10.
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expense of combat effectiveness. The second is that romantic
relationships, especially during extended at-sea periods aboard
Naval vessels, would prove to be detrimental to the morale of
the unit as a whole.
The first point was addressed by Congresswoman
Schroeder in response to the above query of Congressman
Lancaster. She noted two counter arguments. First, military
training and professionalism are likely to prove more powerful
than this ingrained tendency. After all, many men would also
be inclined to stop and help a wounded fellow male, but this
tendency has not been of great import in past conflicts.
Second, attitudes are neither uniform nor static. Con-
gressman Herbert Bateman, discussing the National Opinion
Research Center poll, noted above, stated: "[T]o the extent
that the role of women in the military is denigrated by a cul-
tural bias, the cultural bias is not as strong now and would not
appear likely to be as strong in the future as has been in the
past."1 52 Common sense observations tend to bear that view
out.
As for the concern romance will prove detrimental to
morale, the military is singularly equipped to deal with that
problem. Where a civilian court would be abhorred by a law
prohibiting Public Displays of Affection, the military is not so
constrained. The current Chief of Navy Personnel, Vice Admi-
ral J.M. Boorda, has stated "[o]ur new fraternization policy
seems to be working. It is a common sense approach to a
tough problem. Yes, we have fraternization incidents, but they
are on the decline and our chain of command seems to be
able to deal with them effectively."15 3
Finally, in reviewing this argument it is helpful to keep
Secretary Claytor's words in mind: "You don't board enemy
ships with a cutlass in your teeth any more."1 54 And again,
from arguments one and two above, these situations are al-
ready being faced in today's Navy. It seems unlikely that they
will be substantially more difficult just because they occur
aboard a "combatant."
152. See 1987 Heangs, supra note 7, at 99.
153. 1990 Heatings, supra note 12, at 29.
154. 1978 Heatings, supra note 129, at 1204.
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V. PROPOSAL
The step needed to correct this situation is clear: amend
10 U.S.C. section 6015 so the Secretary of the Navy is not pro-
scribed from assigning women to permanent duty aboard the
Navy's combatant vessels.'55
Congresswoman Schroeder recently noted: "[w]e can only
guess that the combat exclusion law was intended to protect
women in the military from harm, ensure a combat-effective
force, and reflect public opinion. In fact, the law fails on all
three counts." 5 6 When a law is inexplicably denying millions
of young women, and the society at large, such important ben-
efits as are at stake here, the people have a right to better
representation than that offered in the 1948 law 10 U.S.C.
section 6015.
Congress has not responded to Judge Sirica's call for an
examination of the "unanswered questions" regarding integrat-
ing women into combat vessels.'5 7 Thirteen years is long
enough to wait. It's time to shift from the assumption women
would disrupt the military unit and embrace the more widely
held belief in our society that women are as effective as men.
Let objectively defined standards determine which sailors can
serve aboard combatants, not immutable and essentially irrele-
vant factors such as gender.
This is not to say that the government's concern with the
"unknown effects" of integrating these combatants is not valid.
As Judge Sirica noted in his own limited striking of section
6015, "nothing in this decision is meant to shape the contours
of Navy policy concerning the utilization of female person-
nel."' Similarly, nothing in this comment is meant to affect
the rational determinations of the Legislature and the Execu-
tive pertaining to the utilization of military personnel. The goal
155. I propose that § 6015 be amended to read:
The Secretary of the Navy may prescribe the manner in which women
officers, women warrant officers, and enlisted women members of the
Regular Navy and Regular Marine Corps shall be trained and quali-
fied for military duty. The Secretary may prescribe the kind of mili-
tary duty to which such military members may be assigned and the
military authority which they may exercise.
156. 1990 Heaings, supra note 12, at 6.
157. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Sipp. 291, 307 (D.D.C. 1978).
158. Id. at 310.
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should be the establishment of objective standards for all mili-
tary personnel, regardless of sex. The only relevant question
should be: Can this individual do this job?
It must now be left to the courts. What now exists is a
situation where Congress justifies the combat exclusion rule by
pleading "military necessity," and the military is defending
itself by responding "social policy." This cycle will not end
unless the courts hold this law up to the well-established equal
protection test for gender-based discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States military holds a unique position in our
society. The military is the country's largest employer. As an
employer it provides many valuable benefits, some of which
cannot be duplicated in the private sector-or in any other por-
tions of the government. In addition, the military is a highly
visible institution in our society. Honorable service in the mili-
tary continues to lend veterans an air of competence in the
affairs of the country and a right to be involved. Many other
benefits, not least of which is socialization of our young citi-
zens, are available to those who serve-and to the rest of us.
The combat exclusion rules place many limitations upon
women seeking to avail themselves of the benefits the military
offers. The most direct is that it simply places a ceiling on the
number of women that the military can effectively utilize. The
result is that a group which comprises over fifty percent of the
population is restricted to eleven percent participation in the
defense of the nation. The rules also serve to restrict the pro-
fessional advancement of women. Despite the great efforts the
military has undertaken to expand women's career opportuni-
ties, it stands as a simple truth no woman will ever serve on
the Joint Chiefs of Staff until she has combat experience. That
will only happen after the combat exclusion rules are removed.
As the military has struggled with Congress' restrictions,
the Supreme Court has, through great effort, forged a stan-
dard by which laws drawing lines based on gender must be
evaluated. The question becomes: Does Congress' law stand up
to that standard? It seems it does not. While putting forth a
seemingly sensible "military necessity" justification, Congress
has failed to show where such a notion has come from. It ap-
parently has not come from the military.
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Despite the judicial call for a substantial relationship be-
tween government's gender-based discriminations and its pur-
pose, Congress has not acted. In the fifteen years since Craig,
Congress has advanced no reasons for the law which are sub-
stantially related to military effectiveness. In the thirteen years
since Owens, Congress, even in its hearings on amending the
voided statute, has advanced no reasons for the law which are
substantially related to military effectiveness. Even after the
1981 case which supported a gender-based classification in a
military context, but only used the validity of section 6015 as
an assumption, presumably open to challenge, Congress has
advanced no reasons for the law which are substantially related
to military effectiveness.
It is time for this country to give female sailors an objec-
tive review. The only rationale left for excluding women from
the Navy's combatants, lacking as we do any evidence that they
are unfit for such service, must be rooted in our notions that
such work is not for women. The courts have recognized our
Constitution does not accept that justification for a law with
such impact as this. It is time for the courts to extend that
view into the midst of the United States military.
Christopher Horrigan
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